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In this case the plaintiffs are seeking to recover damages for medical malpractice. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants cared for the plaintiff while she was pregnant and that one of the twins died in utero as a result this care.

Case Background

The plaintiffs of the case are seeking to recover damages for alleged malpractice by the defendants. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants cared for the plaintiff while she was pregnant and that one of her twins died in utero as a result of this care. The plaintiff states that she sustained personal injuries, emotional distress, and pecuniary loss.

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Appellant Hospital appeals an order issued by an administrative law judge [“ALJ”] finding that claimant was not subject to compensation under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan [“the plan”], because she was not permanently and substantially “mentally impaired” within the meaning of the plan. Appellants contend that, based on certain undisputed facts, she was permanently and substantially mentally impaired as a matter of law.

The minor child was born at Florida Hospital in Altamonte Springs, Florida, on November 28, 1997. She was deprived of oxygen during birth and sustained serious birth injuries. An expert said that, her parents filed an action for medical malpractice in Seminole County circuit court against the appellant Hospital, as well as the two physicians who provided obstetrical services to the child’s mother, and Mid-Florida OB/GYN Specialists, Inc. Both obstetricians were “participating physicians” under the plan and the hospital was a participating hospital, but the parents did not file or pursue a claim for benefits under the plan.

An Injury Lawyer said that, the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association [“NICA”] intervened in the circuit court action, claiming that the child’s birth injuries were subject to the plan. The circuit court abated the action and required the parents to file a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings to resolve whether the child was covered by the plan. The NICA statute defines “birth-related neurological injury” to mean an injury which, among other things, renders the infant both “permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired.” The parents’ position was that the child did not meet the criteria for coverage under the plan because, although she had suffered significant physical impairments, she had not sustained a permanent and substantial mental impairment.

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This is a claim for medical malpractice against the Manhattan health and hospitals corporation brought by a mother, individually and on behalf of her son. The infant was born at one hospital and allege that the infant sustained meconium aspiration syndrome and hypertonia as a result of the hospital’s mismanagement of the labor and delivery. Though the infant was transferred to another hospital and stayed for almost two weeks, he was then transferred back with the previous hospital where he received continuous treatment. It is also alleged that the infant suffers from brain injury and severe developmental delays.

At the beginning, the court had lack of authority to grant the leave to file a late notice of claim as to the mother’s individual claims because her application is made more than one year and ninety days from the accrual of the incident. As to the infant’s claims, based on the dates of the alleged malpractice, a notice of claim should have been served on the hospital corporations but the infant is the beneficiary of an infancy toll.

Further, entries in the medical records reveal that the infant was developing normally at the time of discharge and there is no indication of a long term injury. In the supporting affidavit, the mother admits to being aware of the conclusion by noting that at the age of three months her son had met all developmental milestones. A neurology visit note also supports the said conclusion. The mother also stated that about 17 months after her delivery, her son had once again met all milestones. The mother stated that she did not learn of her son’s alleged delays until some point and that it was not until more findings led her to believe that her son’s injury was in fact related to his birthing process. It is evident that the mother could not have been aware of any damages attributable to the delivery within 90 days of the date of accrual, or a reasonable time thereafter, as there was no indication that the infant experiences any alleged delays. Consequently, the subject medical records alone do not support that the mother, by its acts or omissions, inflicted injuries to the infant and that the mother should have been aware of same within the applicable 90 days, or a reasonable time thereafter.

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This malpractice case was filed against defendant more than nine year’s after plaintiff’s birth. Accordingly, the medical malpractice was allegedly committed by defendant in connection with the birth of plaintiff on November 2, 1996, from pre-natal care up to his discharge from the hospital on November 9, 1996. Consequently, plaintiff sustained perinatal asphyxia affecting his brain which manifested as cognitive developmental delays, hyperactivity, coordination difficulties, seizures and mental retardation.

A condition precedent to commencement of a tort action against a municipality or public corporation is the service of a notice of claim upon the municipality or public entity within 90 days after the claim arises. The notice of claim herein was served upon defendant almost nine years past the ninety-day deadline for filing a notice of claim.

The Court has the discretionary authority to allow the filing of a late notice of claim within the period of limitation for commencing tort actions against a municipality. An action against a municipality or municipal corporation or entity must be commenced within one year and 90 days after the date plaintiff’s cause of action accrued, which is the date the event occurred upon which plaintiff’s claim is based. Where plaintiff is an infant, the statute of limitations on a medical malpractice action is tolled for a period not exceeding 10 years from the date the cause of action accrued.

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This is a medical malpractice case filed against the defendant hospital because of the negligence committed by its employees during plaintiff’s birth in September 1993. According to the hospital records, the medical employees in attendance gave his mother Pitocin, a drug used to facilitate the birth. The delivery involved two attempts at vacuum extraction and, ultimately, the use of forceps. Records show that the mother’s pelvis was adequate to accommodate the baby’s head and the birth was without complication. The infant weighed 8 pounds, 3½ ounces. His Apgar score was within satisfactory range: eight at one minute after birth and nine at five minutes after birth. The records also reveal that there were marks on his forehead from the forceps and his clavicle was broken. Because of the foregoing, plaintiff is presently suffering from epilepsy and developmental disabilities.

The record reveals that in 1995 plaintiff had an electroencephalogram (EEG), a test to trace his brain waves. The results were normal, but EEGs in 1998 and 1999 showed signs of abnormality. On September 5, 2003, 10 years after plaintiff’s birth, his counsel sent defendant hospitals in Nassau and Suffolk a notice of claim alleging, in essence, that plaintiff suffered brain injury resulting from the hospital’s malpractice during his delivery.

In support of his motion for late service of a notice of claim, plaintiff argued that section 50-e (5) contemplates “actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim,” not knowledge of a specific legal theory, and because defendant hospital is in possession of the medical records, they necessarily have actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim. Plaintiff further argued that the delay in the service of claim was a product of his infancy.

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On September 21, 1982, the Queens complainant 32-year-old woman visited her accused gynecologist for her annual check-up. At that time, the gynecologist made note of a one-centimeter mass on the outside lower quadrant of the woman’s left breast which he tentatively classified as a galactocele or a milk-filled cyst, but no further tests were performed. Ten months later, the woman returned to her Staten Island gynecologist complaining of a painful lump in her left breast and a swelling under her left arm. Following a mammography and other examinations, the mass in the woman’s breast was diagnosed as cancer which had metastasized or spread, to three ribs and two vertebrae. The woman died nearly two years later, as a result of the extensive metastasis of the cancer leaving as the sole beneficiary of her estate her then four-year-old daughter.

At the time her condition was first diagnosed, she was in the process of obtaining a divorce from her husband who contributed nothing toward her own or her child’s support. Although after the birth of her daughter, she had discontinued working outside the home, she was certified as a teacher for kindergarten through twelfth grade and had been a permanent substitute teacher in the Lawrence school district for one and one-half years prior to her daughter’s birth. She held undergraduate degrees in art education and psychology and was working toward obtaining an advanced degree in psychology in preparation for a child psychology program. She had always been a very self-sufficient and independent person. She had fully participated in the daily activities of her child. Because of her rapidly deteriorating physical condition and the negative effects of the medical treatment, the woman’s life changed to a tragically radical degree. She initially underwent two months of hormone therapy which was discontinued when she stopped responding. She began experiencing excruciating pain in her right leg which was determined to be caused by an additional lesion. She was then placed on a program of pain killers including morphine and methadone which her treating physician testified only dulled the recognition of pain in the brain but did not eliminate the pain. She also received a combination of five chemotherapy drugs which caused debilitating side effects. She became constipated, weak and tired, suffered from insomnia and began losing weight at the rate of two or three pounds per week. Her bones became very brittle and she was warned by her physicians to be very careful to avoid breaking them. In fact, she had to be hospitalized on three separate occasions for hypocalcaemia which is an elevation of calcium in the blood causing sleeplessness, lethargy, confusion, difficulty in walking, severe dehydration and ultimately death. The continuous vomiting caused by the chemotherapy resulted in dental infections and the loss of six teeth which she had to have extracted with only a minimal amount of novacaine due to the chemotherapy.

The woman became a virtual invalid. She relied on a homemaker, her friends and family to care for her child, to shop for her, to clean her house, to prepare meals and to drive her to the hospital. She had no physical strength. She was too weak to pick up her daughter or to perform any type of housework. Moreover, because of her weakened bones, she was afraid to go to any crowded places such as a train station or shopping mall for fear of being hit in her ribs or vertebrae. In any event, she was physically unable to shop for herself. Her social life became nonexistent.

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Medical malpractice lawsuits can be sought for many different reasons. Some of them involve birth injury, and some, like the present case involve the care of the elderly. Elderly care homes in New York are governed by many laws, the application of these laws can differ depending on the court system. When a party to a case feels that the rights of one of the parties has been violated, or the laws in the case have been misapplied, it becomes the job of the Supreme Court to evaluate the outcome and decide if the case needs to be reviewed.

In February of 2009, an elderly woman from Queens was living as a long term patient of a nursing home in Rochester, New York. One of the issues that placed her in the care of the home involved a bladder problem. This woman was unable to void her bladder without the assistance of a catheter. Therefore, every day, she had to wait on one of the staff of the home to come and help her to urinate. One night, the staff member failed to come to the aid of the woman. She was desperate for relief and decided that she would exit her bed by herself and attempt to go to the bathroom. When she stood up from her bed, her bladder released causing a puddle on the floor of her room near her bed. She slipped in the puddle and suffered from severe injuries including broken bones. She was not treated for her injuries until her son in law arrived several days later. Her son in law is a doctor. When she told him about the injury and that she was in horrible pain from it, he had her transported by ambulance to the hospital. It was only at that time, that the extent of her injuries were revealed. Her family was distraught that their mother had not received the minimum standard of care that was expected. They filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in her behalf. They used as a standard for their contentions that the public health laws had been violated a case that involved another patient of a long term care nursing facility.

This woman was a young woman who was in a persistent vegetative state. The case is referred to as Doe. The reason that her mother filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the public health laws was that her daughter had been injured in an automobile accident. She was in a persistent vegetative state when it became apparent that she was pregnant. Since she had been a resident of a long term home for more than a year at that point, it was obvious that she had been raped while in their care. She delivered a baby boy by caesarian section. DNA evidence was used to determine which employee of the facility had raped her. Her mother’s contention was that her daughter did not receive the minimum standard of care for a patient in her condition as evidenced by the fact that one of the staff had raped and impregnated her. She proved her point and won her lawsuit. The case is now used as a precedent for nursing home violations. The public health law was instituted to prevent the types of abuses that were evidenced in the current case and the case of Doe. In order to insure that our loved ones who by necessity are bedridden and in a long term home facility, laws that govern insufficient care are important. Nursing homes in Staten Island must be accountable for any abuse or neglect that may occur on their property. However, because the laws are so complicated as they relate to nursing home abuse, it is important for anyone who believes that their loved one has been treated inappropriately to contact an attorney.

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An action to recover damages for medical malpractice was filed. The defendant was found by the court, on the issue of liability, to be 75% at fault and the plaintiff 25% at fault in the causation of the plaintiff’s injuries; and, on the issue of damages, that the plaintiff sustained damages in the sums of $150,000 for past mental distress, $50,000 for future mental distress, and $134,000 for loss of past financial support, and awarded the plaintiff the sum of $166,000 in punitive damages.

Defendant then appeals from the aforesaid decision and upon the denial of his motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict on the issue of liability as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial or, in the alternative, to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of liability and for judgment as a matter of law, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the principal sum of $416,500, and the plaintiff cross-appeals from stated portions of the same judgment.

The Ruling:

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Sometime in August of 2002, plaintiff hired a law firm to represent her in a medical malpractice (personal injury) and wrongful death action concerning the death of her husband. According to the law firm hired, a lawyer, who was then an of counsel lawyer of the firm, was assigned to handle plaintiff’s case.

In early 2003, the underlying action for medical malpractice was commenced against defendants: the Medical Center, the Westchester County Health Care Corporation, and certain doctors.

Thereafter, plaintiff’s lawyer severed his relationship with the law firm hired. Plaintiff then opted to continue to be represented by the lawyer and discharged the law firm. However, sometime after, the lawyer also severed his relationship with the plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff’s son continued to handle the case which was later continued by another law firm.

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On 4 March 1986, plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice personal injury action against the defendant, a licensed physician, alleging that defendant was negligent in the care and treatment of plaintiff’s infant daughter and ultimately caused the child’s wrongful death.

In 1985, as part of a comprehensive reform of medical malpractice, the Legislature enacted CPLR 3406(a) which requires plaintiffs to file a notice of dental, medical or podiatric malpractice action within 60 days of joinder of issue. Plaintiff failed to timely file this notice. Thus, as a sanction, the Appellate Division dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint and reversed the lower court’s decision; the court found that plaintiff had failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for her eight-month delay in seeking an extension and had not demonstrated the merit of her claims.

The Issues:

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