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Petitioner minor child, represented by his parents

Petitioner minor child, represented by his parents is permanently and substantially brain damaged as a result of alleged medical malpracticeon the part of respondent physician and respondent medical center, as well as other medical providers. The petitioner parents filed suit in circuit court against their obstetrician, respondent, his professional association, respondent Hospital, and numerous other defendants. A Florida Medical Malpractice Lawyer said that, the trial court abated the circuit court proceedings for a determination by the Division of Administrative Hearings as to whether the infant’s injuries qualified for coverage under the NICA Plan. In the petition for determination of NICA coverage, petitioners alleged that long after the post-delivery period had ended, the minor child’s medical providers committed numerous errors, including administering too much IV fluid and failing to test for serum electrolyte derangements until numerous days after the delivery. As required by statute, NICA was served with the petition in the administrative proceedings. NICA intervened and took the position that he did not suffer a “birth-related neurological injury” within the scope of section 766.302(2).

A Lawyer said that, in a narrow category of cases in which a “birth-related neurological injury” occurs, parents’ common law rights to sue on behalf of their children for medical malpractice are eliminated and replaced by an administrative remedy that provides limited compensation on a no-fault basis. “Birth-related neurological injury” is defined by statute as “injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired.” § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. (2001).

A Lawyer said that, the First District held that the petitioners were limited to the administrative remedy provided by the NICA Plan, reversing the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ), who found that the minor child did not suffer a “birth-related neurological injury” as defined by the NICA Plan.

The issue in this case is whether, under the factual circumstances of this case, the minor child suffered a “birth-related neurological injury,” which would require the petitioners to obtain limited compensation through the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (NICA Plan) instead of full damages in a court of law.

In deciding the case the Court said that, in 1988, the Florida Legislature created the NICA Plan as a means to alleviate the high costs of medical malpractice insurance for physicians practicing obstetrics. The Legislature found that obstetricians were among the most severely affected by the increasing medical malpractice insurance premiums and that the costs of birth-related neurological injury claims were particularly high.. Consequently, the Legislature created the NICA fund to “provide compensation, on a no-fault basis, for a limited class” of birth-related neurological injuries. Because the NICA Plan provides limited remedies as a statutory substitute for common law rights and liabilities, this Court has held that the NICA statute “should be strictly construed to include only those subjects clearly embraced within its terms.” The NICA Plan does not cover all incidents of brain damage sustained by an infant delivered by an obstetrician. No party in this case contends that the statute provides immunity from suit to physicians practicing obstetrics for alleged malpractice occurring during labor and delivery; rather, the immunity is narrowly circumscribed by the term “birth-related neurological injury.” Specifically, the Legislature has limited coverage under the NICA Plan to a “birth-related neurological injury,” which it defined as injury to the brain or spinal cord of a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams for a single gestation caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. This definition shall apply to live births only and shall not include disability or death caused by genetic or congenital abnormality.
Thus, based on the language of the statute, a birth-related neurological injury has four components: (1) an injury to the brain or spinal cord; (2) which is caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury; (3) during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period; and (4) which renders the infant permanently and substantially impaired.
The ALJ has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a claim is compensable under the NICA Plan. (“The issue of whether such claims are covered by this act must be determined exclusively in an administrative proceeding.”). In making this determination, the ALJ is required to make the following determinations: (1) whether the injury claimed is a birth-related neurological injury; (2) whether obstetrical services were delivered by a participating physician in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital; and (3) the amount of compensation that is awardable. In determining whether the injury is a birth-related neurological injury, section 766.309(1)(a) provides for a rebuttable presumption as follows:

If the claimant has demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the administrative law judge, that the infant has sustained a brain or spinal injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury and that the infant was thereby rendered permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the injury is a birth-related neurological injury as defined in s. 766.302(2)§ 766.309(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). Through this presumption, the claimant does not need to demonstrate that the injury occurred during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period. Under the NICA statute, NICA is the administrator of the NICA Plan and has statutory responsibilities, including the responsibility to administer the funds collected on behalf of the Plan, administer the payment of claims on behalf of the Plan, exercise all powers necessary to effect any of the purposes for which the Plan was created, and take legal action as necessary to avoid the payment of improper claims, among other duties.

Because the issue involves whether the First District properly interpreted the NICA statute, this Court’s standard of review is de novo. The Court must begin with the actual language in the statute “because legislative intent is determined primarily from the statute’s text.” As this Court has often repeated, “When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Further, courts are “without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.” Likewise, when a court interprets a statute, “it must give full effect to all statutory provisions. Courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” Another important principle that applies in this case is that because the NICA Plan limits the remedies as a statutory substitute for common law rights and liabilities, its provisions should be strictly construed. In applying the statute to this case, there is no factual dispute that the minor child suffered from two incidents of oxygen deprivation: one on September 26, 2001, and the other on October 3, 2001. Nor is there any question that she suffered a brain injury that rendered her permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. The only question becomes whether the minor child’s brain injury occurred “in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital.”

Here, the ALJ made factual findings that Tristan did not suffer a “birth-related neurological injury” as defined by the NICA Plan because the minor child’s profound neurologic impairments resulted from a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation that occurred on October 3, 2001, and not during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in the hospital.” In making this determination, the ALJ found that although the record established that the minor child, more likely than not, suffered from oxygen deprivation at birth on September 26, resulting in a multi-system failure that included her liver and kidneys, this oxygen deprivation did not cause a substantial neurological impairment. In support of this finding, the ALJ noted that the record established that she was delivered a traumatically, responded well to initial resuscitation, and her neurological examinations during the first seven days of life were normal. However, on October 3, she suffered prolonged and severe acidosis and shortly thereafter evidenced seizure activity and neurological decline. The Court holds that a narrow construction of the statute is the more reasonable interpretation. First, it restricts the impact of the statute to those situations involving obstetricians, who are the group of physicians that the NICA Plan was designed to benefit. Otherwise, as NICA points out in its brief, under the First District’s interpretation, the statute would be expanded to cover situations where an infant is “transferred from the delivery room” and the “obstetrician relinquishes responsibility of the infant to other health care providers.”

The Court concludes that the First District’s statutory construction analysis of the applicable statute was flawed in two separate ways. First, the district court interpreted the phrase “immediate post-delivery period in the hospital” to mean “an extended period of days when a baby is delivered with a life-threatening condition and requires close supervision.” Because the First District failed to read the phrase “immediate post-delivery period” as modifying “resuscitation,” the First District expanded the NICA Plan to cover infants beyond the limit contemplated by the express language of the statute. Second, the First District incorrectly held that under section 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), the rebuttable presumption of coverage under the NICA Plan applied to benefit the defendants, even though the petitioners were not making a claim for compensation under the NICA Plan.

Accordingly, the Court holds that in order for a “birth-related neurological injury” to occur, the birth injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation, which renders the infant permanently and substantially impaired, must occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period. That period does not encompass an additional “extended period of time when a baby is delivered in a life-threatening condition” unless there are ongoing and continuous efforts of resuscitation. Both the incident of oxygen deprivation and the brain injury resulting from the oxygen deprivation must occur in this time period. Further, regarding the statutory presumption, only the individual seeking compensation under the NICA Plan is entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption. Based on our analysis, the Court approves the analysis in Orlando Regional to the extent that it is consistent with this decision, quash the First District’s decision below, and remand to the First District with directions to affirm the ALJ’s final order. Long Island and Manhattan Courts have dealt with similar cases.

In view of the foregoing, the Court held that in reviewing the facts under the correct interpretation of the statute, the Court holds that the ALJ’s finding that the minor child did not sustain a “birth-related neurological injury” under the NICA Plan is supported by competent, substantial evidence.

If you child suffered from birth injuries due to the medical malpractice of a physician or the hospital staff, seek the help of a Florida Medical Malpractice Attorney and Florida Spinal Injury Attorney in order to file the appropriate claim for damages against the party at fault. Our Florida Personal Injury Attorney at Stephen Bilkis and Associates will stand by you in the entire duration of your case. Call us for free consultation.

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