Articles Posted in Brooklyn

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The case before the court is one of legal malpractice. The Bronx plaintiff had a bi-lateral mastectomy, which she claims was the result of being misdiagnosed. The plaintiffs are seeking a judgment against the defendants for negligently prosecuting a medical malpractice action on behalf of the plaintiff.

Case Background
In March of 2006, the law firm defendants filed a motion to have the complaint against them dismissed. In October of 2006 the court issued an interim order that directed all of the parties to provide a briefing on the issue of the bankrupt extension. The court reviewed the briefs and heard oral arguments. The court then made the decision to deny the dismissal of the complaint.

In February of 2007, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add an associate of the legal defendants. The defendants filed a motion to have this complaint dismissed arguing that the complaint is time barred, that the plaintiffs do not have standing to invoke the bankruptcy extension, and that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead fraudulent concealment.

Court Discussion and Decision
The main legal issue in this particular case is whether the Brooklyn defendants have demonstrated as a matter of law that even if they had raised a two year extension in the medical malpractice suit the suit would still have been time barred.

In this particular case, the court finds that the defendants have failed to meet the burden of showing that their failure to assert the bankruptcy tolling of the statute of limitations in the medical malpractice suit could not have deprived the plaintiffs of a judgment in their favor.
For this reason, the court is denying the motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The ruling is in favor of the plaintiffs.
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This is an instant action brought forth by the plaintiff for herself, her deceased husband, and her four children. The case involves personal injury claims that arise from a car accident and medical malpractice claims in regard to the treatment that her husband received at the defendant hospital for the injuries that he sustained during the car accident.

Prior to this action the Bronx driver of the other vehicle that was involved in the accident began this own action for personal injuries that he sustained during the accident.

The plaintiffs have moved to consolidate both actions for a joint trial. The defendants in the second action have opposed stating that consolidating the actions will result in undue prejudice and jury confusion. In addition, the defendants in the second action have moved to sever the causes of action that pertain to the car accident and those actions that pertain to the medical malpractice action. The defendant is also seeking to have the venue moved to Albany County where the treatment was provided.

Case Background
The Brooklyn plaintiff’s decedent was in a car accident that resulted in serious injuries to himself, his wife, and their four children. According to the plaintiffs they were driving on Route 23 in Green County when their car was hit by the defendant driver. After the accident the decedent was taken to Columbia Memorial Hospital and was then transported to the defendant hospital.
On the day after the accident the decedent underwent surgery for his injuries on his right foot, knee, and leg. He suffered from complications after the surgery, allegedly related to the respiratory treatment and anesthesia and passed away.

The driver of the other vehicle sustained injuries as well and contends the accident was the fault of the decedent. He started an action on the 8th of February, 2010 for the injuries that he allegedly sustained during the accident. The family of the decedent started the instant personal injury and medical malpractice action against the driver of the other vehicle and various medical providers in August of 2010.

The issues before the court are whether this action involving the personal injuries suffered by the family of the decedent and the medical malpractice of the medical personnel defendants should be consolidated with the action that was commenced by the driver of the other vehicle for the injuries that he sustained during the accident, whether the alleged medical malpractice case should be severed from the causes of action that pertain to the car accident, and if the venue of New York County is appropriate.

Case Discussion and Decision
The plaintiffs contend that the two actions regarding the accident should be combined because they both stem from the same car accident and therefor contain common issues of law. The driver of the second vehicle argues that because of the medical malpractice claims these should not be combined because the issues in the decedent’s family case are more complex.

After reviewing the facts of the case, the motion to combine the cases is granted. Holding separate trials in this matter would result in conflicting results. In addition, the medical malpractice claims will not be severed and will be heard by the same jury. The court also finds that the venue of New York County is appropriate as it is the county where the defendant driver resides. The venue will remain the same.
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The Staten Island plaintiff in this case is appealing an order made in the Supreme Court of Kings County. The order that is being appealed by the plaintiff denied his motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the defendant dismissing the complaint as made against the defendant. The entire case stems from an underlying medical malpractice suit.

Court Discussion
Under the plain language of the insurance policy in question the plaintiff is not covered for contractual liability that was assumed by entering into service agreements with the independent contractors in the case. However, the plaintiff could have been held vicariously liable for the actions of the independent contractors and for that reason the plaintiff is entitled to recover his legal costs for defending against his own liability.

Court Decision
The court is modifying the original order that was made in the Supreme Court of Brooklyn. The provision of the order that granted summary judgment to the defendant to dismiss the complaint to recover legal costs incurred for defending the plaintiff’s liability in the medical malpractice action is deleted.

The provision of the order that denied the branch of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment for the claim for legal costs is deleted and in its place there is a provision granting this motion. The matter will be remitted to the Supreme Court of Kings County to determine the amount of legal costs that will be awarded to the plaintiff.
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The appeal before the court raises the question as to whether a patient of a medical group that has allegedly suffered from an injury caused by malpractice of the doctors that are associated with the group is entitled to the benefit of the continuous treatment doctrine against the doctors that have allegedly committed the malpractice where the patient has continued to receive treatment for the same injury, illness, or condition from other members of the same group after the alleged wrongdoing doctors have left the group.

Case Background
The defendants are two physicians who left the group. They have moved for summary judgment at Special Term on the basis of the alleged termination of the relationship of each of the movants with the other defendants that were their former partners. They argue that upon leaving the group the statute of limitations started to run for any acts of malpractice that they may have committed while a member of the group. As a consequence of this argument, the action in this particular case that was started in February of 1980 is time barred.

This motion has been denied by the Special Term. The reason for denying the motion was stated that there is a question of fact in regard to the case that needs to be resolved. The court must determine whether a sufficient nexus exists between the moving defendants and the doctors in the group practice that continued to treat the patient after they left.

Case Facts
The medical malpractice action in this case was filed by the defendant patient in February, 1980. The plaintiff in the case had his first contact with the defendants in 1973 when he met with the physician because of constant pain, tingling, and numbness in his leg. The doctor concluded that the symptoms were coming from a mass lesion or tumor in the left cerebral hemisphere. He recommended that the plaintiff be admitted for further neurological testing.

The two Bronx doctors that left the group last treated the patient in January of 1974. One of the doctors left the group in August of 1974 and the other left in December of the same year. The patient continued to be cared for by the group until 1978.

Court Discussion and Decision
The Brooklyn court is affirming the decision that was made in the Special Term that denied the motion for summary judgment on the grounds of the complaint being time barred.

In this particular case the court finds that the continuous treatment doctrine is applicable to toll the Statute of Limitation for a malpractice action against the physicians that allegedly committed an act of medical malpractice and have terminated their relationship with the group medical practice. If the patient was considered to be a group patient, was treated by the group, and remained under the care of the group even after the primary care physicians have left the group, the continuous treatment doctrine must be applied.
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This is a medical malpractice case where it is alleged that the plaintiff suffered from injuries as a result of the still birth of her infant as a result of prenatal malpractice and negligence of the defendants.

The plaintiff sought prenatal care from the defendants starting in July of 2001 through November of 2001 for her pregnancy. The result was a still birth on the fourteenth of December. The plaintiff states that she was exposed to DES which increased her risk of having an incompetent cervix and that the defendants should have performed a cerclage procedure in order to tighten her cervix to prevent a still birth or miscarriage.

Case Background
The plaintiff started this case in June of 2004. There are six causes of action asserted by the plaintiff including medical malpractice, lack of informed consent, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and retention, and inadequate staffing and negligent health care facility administration.

Case Discussion
The plaintiff’s cause of action for medical malpractice and for lack of informed consent is governed by a 2 and ½ year statute of limitations. It is noted that the plaintiff did not seek treatment from the defendants after the 8th of November, 2001 and because of this these causes of action are both time barred.

The cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress was only recently created by the court of appeals where it was held that even in the absence of an independent injury medical malpractice that results in a miscarriage or still birth should be construed as a violation of a duty of care to the expectant mother entitling her to damages for emotional distress.

The Bronx and Brooklyn defendants argue that this is barred by the two and a half year time limit as well. However, the new ruling may have changed this. The plaintiff must provide evidence to demonstrate that the defendant’s action was a departure from the accepted standard of care in the medical community.

The motion by the defendants for leave to reargue separate orders are granted and upon re-argument the summary judgment motion from the doctor is granted to the extent that all of the causes of action that were asserted against him.
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On 10 October 1956, an infant who was about fifteen months old, while at home, suffered severe burns for which the defendants bear no responsibility. The infant was taken first to his family’s doctor who advised that he be taken to a hospital. The infant was then hospitalized at Kings County Hospital in Brooklyn.

On 11 October 1956, at 8:15 a. m., about thirteen hours after the infant was admitted to the hospital, he appeared to be unconscious and slightly cyanotic. Cyanosis is a condition in which the skin becomes blue, as a result of insufficient oxygen in the blood, or due to a malformation of the heart. The mother of the infant plaintiff, with respect to her son’s condition before he was admitted to Kings County Hospital, states that the boy was about a year old when he began to talk, that he started to walk at eleven months, fed himself and ate very good; however, when she took him home from the hospital, the infant could not walk, could not talk, did not respond when spoken to, and that his body still had jerky movements. The infant couldn’t hold up his head erect. It keeps bobbing, and he was not the same boy.
Consequently, a personal injury action for medical malpractice has been instituted. The defendants are the City of New York and Kings County Hospital. However, only the action against The City of New York went to the jury. The action against Kings County Hospital was dismissed during the trial.

At the trial, the infant had reached the age of about 5 years and 9 months but was unable to walk, talk, sit, feed, or care for himself in any way.

The substance of the medical testimony elicited at the trial on behalf of the plaintiffs was that the defendant failed to care properly for the infant, particularly during his first twelve hours in the hospital, that, as a consequence, the infant lapsed into irreversible shock which caused his brain to become damaged from lack of oxygen and that the infant’s failure to develop physically and mentally and his present physical and mental condition are a direct result of the defendant’s malpractice or failure to treat the infant properly.

Subsequently, there were two verdicts, one for $150,000 in favor of the infant plaintiff, the other for $45,000 in favor of the infant’s father for medical expenses and loss of services.
The Issue:

Is defendant liable to infant plaintiff and plaintiff father? Was the court’s decision proper?

The Ruling:

General Municipal Law provides, inter alia, that in any case founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action against a public corporation, such notice of claim shall be given within ninety days after the claim arises.
Here, the plaintiffs themselves agree that the provisions of the aforesaid statute are applicable to the instant action. The chronology of the dates upon which there transpired events important to a determination of whether plaintiffs filed their notice of claim on time are: 10 October 1956, the infant plaintiff was admitted to Kings County Hospital; 11 October 956, the day on which the infant plaintiff succumbed to irreversible shock, after which, the jury could have found, the child never again was able to stand, walk, talk or respond to attempts to communicate with him; 22 April 1957, 27 April 1957, 5 May 1957 and 25 November 1957, all dates upon which it was alleged by the plaintiffs, the defendants were guilty of continuing and additional acts of malpractice. With respect to these four dates, the most important date as far as a determination of the motion is concerned, is the last, i. e., 25 November 1957. Plaintiffs’ attorney himself admits that the defendants were guilty of no malpractice after this date which, as will shortly be seen, was more than ninety days before plaintiffs’ notice of claim was filed. On 14 February 1958, the infant plaintiff was discharged from Kings County Hospital. On 10 April 1958, a notice of claim was served upon the City of New York.

As stated, the law requires that the notice of claim be filed within ninety days after the claim arises. All of the dates stated above are more than ninety days before the claim was filed except 14 February 1958, the day on which the infant plaintiff was discharged from Kings County Hospital.

Thus, the question to be resolved is when the claims of the plaintiffs arose. If they arose on 11 October 1956 when the boy went into irreversible shock, or on 22 April 1957, 27 April 1957, 5 May 1957, or 25 November 1957, the dates upon which plaintiffs contend the defendants committed continuing and additional acts of medical malpractice, then plaintiffs’ notice of claim was late. If plaintiffs’ claims arose on 14 February 1958, the day the infant was discharged from Kings County Hospital, plaintiffs filed their claims on time.

At this juncture, the court equates the day a patient is discharged from a hospital with the day a doctor last treats a patient. As a result, it is held that the 90 days within which a claim had to be filed on behalf of the plaintiffs started to run on 14 February 1958, the day the infant was discharged from Kings County Hospital. Hence, the claim was filed well within that time, on 10 April 1958. This is consonant with the objectives sought to be obtained through the enactment of the General Municipal Law. In its Tenth Annual Report and Studies, in the supporting study entitled “Recommended Improvements and Unification of Requirements of Notices of Claim against Municipal Corporations”, the Judicial Council stated that the requirement of notice is one of the safeguards devised by the law to protect municipalities against fraudulent and stale claims for an injury to person and property. It is designed to afford the municipality opportunity to make an early investigation of the claim while the facts surrounding the alleged claim are still fresh. On the other hand, these provisions were not intended as a trap for the unwary and the ignorant.’

In sum, the motion to set aside the verdicts on the ground that the plaintiffs’ notice of claim was not served in time is denied.

On another note, there is more merit to the motion to set aside the $45,000 verdict for the plaintiff father on the ground that it is excessive. The proof was that the amount of the hospital bill rendered to the plaintiff father by the City of New York was in the sum of $11,868. The $45,000 verdict in favor of the plaintiff father for medical expenses and for loss of services is excessive and that cause of action is severed and a new trial granted on that cause of action unless within 30 days after the decision appears in the New York Law Journal, the plaintiff father shall stipulate to reduce the verdict in his favor to $17,500.
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In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the wife of the plaintiff Ulysses Simmons gave birth to their daughter, the infant plaintiff, Ivette Sheyanne Simmons, following what was an otherwise normal and uncomplicated pregnancy, via vaginal delivery after about two hours of labor, at the defendant Brooklyn Hospital Center (hereinafter refered to as the Hospital). However, according to medical records, the infant plaintiff was born macrosomic (excessive size), blue and diagnosed with fetal hydrops, also referred to as hydrops fetalis (total body edema) presumably due to intrauterine infection, resulting in anemia, thrombocytopenia (low platelet count), and brain hemorrhage. The infant was subsequently diagnosed with cerebral palsy involving global developmental delays and seizures.

The plaintiffs commenced this medical malpractice action against, among others, the defendant Snehaprabha Lotlikar (hereinafter Dr. Lotlikar), an employee of the defendant Bedford-Williamsburg Medical Group, which is also sued herein as the defendant Central Brooklyn Medical Group, P.C. (hereafter together Bedford-Williamsburg). Dr. Lotlikar saw the mother during the 34th week of pregnancy, and then again during the 35th to 36th week of pregnancy.

A Lawyer said that, plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Lotlikar deviated from accepted medical practice by failing to perform a sonogram on each of those visits, and that said departure was a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s birth injuries because it would have revealed her macrosomic condition and fetal hydrops, which in turn would have led to delivery via cesarean section. Additionally, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendant Phillipe J. Day (hereinafter Dr. Day), who was also employed by Bedford-Williamsburg, and who was involved in the first hour of the mother’s labor at the Hospital, alleging that he deviated from accepted medical practice by failing to perform a sonogram. The plaintiffs also sought relief against Dr. Waltrous, who was also employed by Bedford-Williamsburg, and who was involved in the second hour of the mother’s labor and actually delivered the infant plaintiff, alleging that she deviated from accepted medical practice by failing to perform a sonogram. The plaintiffs also sought relief against Patrick LeBlanc (hereafter Dr. LeBlanc), who was employed by the Hospital, and who treated the infant plaintiff immediately following her delivery in the Hospital’s neo-natal intensive care unit for her hydrops fetalis condition, alleging that he deviated from accepted medical practice by engaging in a more conservative course of treatment, rather than performing aggressive treatment referred to as paracentisis and thoracentesis (the insertion of tubes into the body to remove fluids therefrom). Additionally, the plaintiffs seek to hold the Hospital vicariously liable for Dr. LeBlanc’s alleged medical malpractice, and to hold Bedford-Williamsburg vicariously liable for the alleged medical malpractice of Drs. Lotlikar, Day, and Waltrous. The defendants’ moved and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as the complaint asserted against them.

The Supreme Court granted the motion and cross motions by Drs. Day, Waltrous, and LeBlanc, as well as the Hospital, in their entirety. However, the Supreme Court denied Dr. Lotlikar’s cross motion, and consequently, awarded summary judgment only to Bedford-Williamsburg dismissing the complaint to the extent it asserted vicarious liability claims against Bedford-Williamsburg for the alleged medical malpractice of Drs. Day and Waltrous.

The issue in this case is whether the defendants are entitled for summary judgment dismissing the complaint asserted against them.

The Court held that, the requisite elements of proof in a medical malpractice action are a deviation or departure from accepted community standards of practice and evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of injury or damage. On a motion for summary judgment, a defendant doctor has the burden of establishing the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice or that the plaintiff was not injured thereby. General allegations of medical malpractice, merely conclusory and unsupported by competent evidence tending to establish the essential elements of medical malpractice, are insufficient to defeat a defendant physician’s summary judgment motion.

The Court said that, in opposition to the prima facie showing of judgment as a matter of law by Drs. Day, Waltrous, and LeBlanc, the plaintiffs submitted a medical expert opinion which was conclusory and speculative, and otherwise insufficient in form and substance to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly granted summary judgment to those doctors dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. Consequently, the Supreme Court also correctly granted summary judgment to the Hospital dismissing the vicarious liability claims asserted against it pertaining to Dr. LeBlanc, as well as the vicarious liability claims asserted against Bedford-Williamsburg pertaining to Drs. Day and Waltrous.

As to Dr. Lotlikar, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ opposition to her prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her, was conclusory and speculative, particularly on the issue of proximate causation and, therefore, her cross motion should have been granted as well. Specifically, the plaintiffs’ medical expert’s opinion that a sonogram performed at weeks 34, 35, or 36 of pregnancy would have detected hydrops fetalis, is based on the speculative assumption that the in utero infection that caused this condition was present at that time. Indeed, Dr. Lotliker’s expert observed that the medical record is void of any indication that the mother was suffering from an in utero infection during her two visits with Dr. Lotlikar. Inasmuch as summary judgment should have been awarded to Dr. Lotlikar dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her, the same applies to the vicarious liability claims asserted against her employer, Bedford-Williamsburg, pertaining to her alleged medical malpractice.

Thus, the NYC Court ordered that the cross appeal by the defendant Leone L. Waltrous is dismissed. Further, the Court held that the order is reversed insofar as cross-appealed from by the defendants Phillippe J. Day, Bedford-Williamsburg Medical Group, Central Brooklyn Medical Group, P.C., and Snehaprabha Lotlikar, that branch of the cross motion of the defendants Phillippe J. Day, Bedford-Williamsburg Medical Group, and Central Brooklyn Medical Group, P.C., which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it asserted vicarious liability claims against the defendants Bedford-Williamsburg Medical Group and Central Brooklyn Medical Group, P.C., for the alleged medical malpractice committed by the defendant Snehaprabha Lotlikar is granted, the cross motion of the defendant Snehaprabha Lotlikar for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her is granted; and it is further, ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further, ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants Phillippe J. Day, Leone L. Waltrous, Snehaprabha Lotlikar, Patrick LeBlanc, the Brooklyn Hospital Center, Bedford-Williamsburg Medical Group, and Central Brooklyn Medical Group, P.C., appearing separately and filing separate briefs, payable by the plaintiffs.

Finally, the Court held that the appeal by the defendant Dr. Waltrous must be dismissed on the ground that she is not aggrieved by the order appealed from. The issues raised on Dr. Waltrous’s appeal have been considered in support of her contention that the order appealed from should be affirmed to the extent it granted her cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.
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In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, a source said that, plaintiff Valerie Abdelkader, mother and natural guardian of Laila Abdelkader, alleged that Laila’s Erb’s Palsy injury was caused by the medical malpractice of the defendant doctor in connection with the obstetrical care administered at Laila’s birth on July 2, 1997. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the principal sums of $300,000 for past pain and suffering and $500,000 for future pain and suffering.

Thereafter, a source said that, the defendant appeals the judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated October 17, 2007, which, upon a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against him finding that the plaintiff sustained damages in the principal sums of $300,000 for past pain and suffering and $500,000 for future pain and suffering, and upon an order of the same court dated May 31, 2007, which denied his motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence or to set aside the damages award as excessive, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the principal sums of $300,000 for past pain and suffering and $500,000 for future pain and suffering.

The issue in this case is whether the damages in accordance with the evidence presented, awarded to the plaintiff is excessive.

The Court held that, a jury verdict may not be set aside as being against the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence. Moreover, issues regarding the credibility of expert witnesses are peculiarly within the province of the jury to determine. In this case the Court said that, it cannot be said that the evidence so preponderated in favor of the defendant that the jury could not have reached a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on any fair interpretation of the evidence. There is no basis in the record to disturb the jury’s resolution of credibility issues in favor of the plaintiff.

However, the New York City Court agrees with the defendant that the award of damages of the principal sums of $300,000 for past pain and suffering, and $500,000 for future pain and suffering, deviates from what would be reasonable compensation, and is excessive to the extent indicated herein.

Hence, the Court ordered that the judgment be reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the damages award as excessive is granted, the order is modified accordingly, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial on the issue of damages for past and future pain and suffering only, unless within 30 days after service upon the plaintiff of a copy of this decision and order, the plaintiff shall serve and file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, Brooklyn a written stipulation consenting to reduce the verdict as to damages for past pain and suffering from the principal sum of $300,000 to the principal sum of $150,000, and for future pain and suffering from the principal sum of $500,000 to the principal sum of $400,000, and to the entry of an appropriate amended judgment accordingly; in the event that the plaintiff so stipulates, then the judgment, as so reduced and amended, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
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Health is the most precious thing that we all own, that’s why there are increasing numbers of doctors all over the world. In Islamabad there are over 600,000 active unqualified doctors practicing medicine explains a well-known doctor. An estimated 70,000 of these doctors are thought to be at risk of spreading diseases and infections due to poor hygiene and practices. These doctors lack the basic medical training which would ensure that patients are kept safe from infectious diseases.

Medical malpractice is a common problem which can happen anywhere. The doctor remarks that malpractice claims are increasing every year in America with many more patients filing suits. Although most of the doctors in America are qualified, there is still a risk that they will neglect their patients.

Many patients in the US suffer permanent injuries and scarring for the rest of their lives, and others die as a result of incorrect medical treatment. While there are risks associated with every medical procedure, it’s important that negligence itself does not increase the risks.

The Pakistan Medical Association is trying to crack down on these unqualified doctors to make the healthcare system in the country much safer. This is the reason why the American Government regulates the healthcare industry so tightly. Doctors practicing medicine must be licensed and any claims against them will be investigated carefully.

Many of these unqualified doctors get work because of testimonials from previous patients. While some patients will be treated successfully without endangering their lives, many more are put at unnecessary risk. This is a form of medical malpractice, but few people in the country bother filing for malpractice suits like happens in the USA.

Americans in Manhattan and Brooklyn are advising experts in Pakistan about how to revise the healthcare system in the country to make it safer. The country is spending millions of dollars on supervising the medical sector and trying to improve the safety records. The American Medical Malpractice Lawyer mentions that healthcare is a very important concern for governments all around the world.
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Lawyers and doctors don’t generally get on very well. There are a number of reasons for this, but the most common is because of distrust between both doctors and lawyers. There are many medical malpractice stories floating around the internet comments the source.

Many doctors who charge Medicaid or Medicare for various medical procedures for tests that aren’t really necessary. This means that they are actually committing fraud according to Medicare and Medicaid programs.

The law has been made very clear to discuss this type of fraud, says the rep. When the issue was discussed at congressional hearings the doctors actually admitted the practice and then ended up trying to deny it when they were asked if they billed Medicare for the tests.

On the internet though, doctors are just as stupid when it comes to now knowing when to stop talking. The doctors are admitting on the internet that they do order unnecessary tests on a regular basis. Some doctors are even saying that they know how to beat the system and avoid getting caught out by the auditors. These doctors are costing the government more than they really should be for the same level of service.

Doctors are blatantly flouting the law just to boost their bottom lines. One doctor requested unnecessary tests on a patient which admitted that it was of no medical benefit to the patient. However, he then went on to say that he could find a way to prove that the tests were done for a specific reasons if it was ever needed.

The same doctors in The Bronx and Brooklyn said on justifying his actions said that the audit would never reveal the fraud. That’s because he believes he is better than the auditor. He thinks it is possible to justify any actions as being necessary and reasonable, even if they are just done to make more money.

Virtually any test could be ordered to look at any condition says the study. Chest pain can be tested using CT scans, EKG, And O2 Sat. It is very easy for a doctor to justify any of these tests even if they weren’t really required.
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