Articles Posted in Manhattan

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Defendants New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) and Dr. PN (collectively defendants) move for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint insofar as asserted against them.

In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff alleges that defendants deviated from accepted standards of medical care while he was being treated in the hospital for severe injuries he sustained in an automobile accident. The Manhattan plaintiff alleges, among other things, that defends its improperly and negligently positioned and restrained his wrists, failed to monitor the effects of the restraints, negligently failed to perform physical therapy on him, and negligently caused his arms to become paralyzed and non-functional.

On December 29, 2004, plaintiff, then age 62, was driving his vehicle when it struck trees, a fence and landed in a courtyard, ejecting him from the driver’s side window. Plaintiff sustained various injuries, including a hemorrhage of the head, a crushed left leg from his foot to hip, and multiple lacerations and abrasions. EMS brought plaintiff to Kings County Hospital emergency room, where plaintiff was described as alert, combative, and intoxicated. Plaintiff was intubated and x-rays and abdominal/pelvic ct-scans were performed. Plaintiff sustained fractures of the pelvis, left femur, and left tibia/fibula, and had internal bleeding.

According to Dr. PN, plaintiff required significant treatment to save his life. He was unstable in the emergency room and Dr. PN did not know if he was going to survive. A CAT scan was taken to look at plaintiff’s head injury and to identify his severe pelvic fracture, but he become progressively more unstable and hemorrhaging. He underwent multiple massive transfusions, and was then transferred to the intensive care unit, where he was still unstable. Dr. PN testified that over the next 24 to 48 hours, she and other medical personnel were able to stabilize plaintiff, but he remained in extremely critical condition.

Dr. PN made the first order for wrist restraints on December 30, 2004, at 5:30 A.M. Orders for wrist restraints were written daily, from December 30, 2004 until February 6, 2005, while plaintiff was still in the intensive care unit. With respect to the need to restrain plaintiff in the critical care unit, Dr. PN testified that it was to protect himself as plaintiff was very dependent on a ventilator, required an endotracheal tube for his ventilator and multiple IV lines for his support, that he repeatedly reached and tried to pull out his lines.

Defendants also state that the flow sheets document that the nursing staff at the hospital checked wrist restraints for skin integrity, circulation and range of motion on regular intervals while plaintiff was restrained.

On February 11, 2005, physical therapy in Staten Island documented 15 to 20 degree extension/flexion in the left elbow and 15 to 30 degree flexion/extension in the right elbow. On February 14, 2005, plaintiff was evaluated for physical therapy. Bedside therapy was recommended three to four times per week to prevent further contractures and muscle weakness bilaterally in the upper and lower extremities and began at that time.

On April 5, 2005, one week prior to discharge, therapy documented a 15 degree lag in extension/20 degrees flexion of the left elbow and a 10 degree lag in extension/forty degree flexion in the right elbow. Despite two months of intensive therapy, after the wrist restraints were removed, plaintiff’s upper extremity contractures persisted.

On July 12, 2005, bilateral elbow x-rays performed at the Kings County Hospital outpatient clinic revealed a diagnosis of heterotopic ossification.

On August 19, 2005, surgery for the right elbow contracture release and excision of heterotopic calcification was performed at Kings County Hospital. On October 28, 2005, surgery for left elbow contracture release and excision of heterotopic calcification was performed.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent in July, 2006.

In support of their motion, defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint based upon the affidavits of their expert physicians, which demonstrate that there was no departure from accepted standards of practice and that defendants did not cause plaintiff’s injuries.

A doctor (Dr. A) witness for the defendant testified that wrist restraints are routinely used for intensive unit patients who are often at increased risk of injuring themselves by pulling out therapies such as IV lines, endotracheal tubes, central lines and chest tubes. He also stated that wrist restraints allow for some range of motion and enable a degree of flexion and extension of the wrists and elbows and pronation and supination of the arms, as evidenced by the fact that on January 30, 2005 plaintiff was seen holding the dislodged chest tube tubing with his restrained left hand. The doctor said that there was no evidence that plaintiff’s wrist restraints ever caused circulatory impairment, were improperly positioned, or that plaintiff developed any pressure sores in the wrist area; and that the wrists restraints were a necessary and vital part of plaintiff’s management.

Like Dr. A, Dr. B testified that there is sufficient documentation that the nursing staff continuously monitored the wrist restraints according to hospital protocol; that there was no evidence that plaintiff’s wrist restraints ever caused circulatory impairment, were improperly positioned, or that plaintiff developed any pressure sores in the wrist area; and that the wrists restraints were a necessary and vital part of plaintiff’s management.

Dr. B further stated that despite intense physical therapy received after the removal of wrist restraints, the elbow contractures persisted.

Dr. B explained as well that heterotopic ossification is a medical condition which involves the gradual formation of bone in the soft tissue around major joints; that the normal soft tissue of the joint turns into bone; that it is a rare condition which is most frequently seen with musculoskeletal trauma, spinal cord injury, or central nervous system injury; that there is no medical evidence which suggests that heterotopic ossification has any relation to immobilization or restraint; and that physical therapy is not usually an effective treatment of heterotopic ossification and was not effective on plaintiff.

Further, Dr. B noted that plaintiff was diagnosed with a C1-C2 subluxation at the time of admission but no surgery could be performed because of plaintiff’s general medical condition, and that stabilization surgery was performed on March 28, 2005. He stated that the relationship between spinal injury and heterotopic ossification is well established, and that as a result of plaintiff’s spinal cord injury, he was diagnosed with spastic quadraparesis in the hospital ambulatory care clinic on June 16, 2006.

As such, Dr. B opined, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that plaintiff developed heterotopic ossification (HO) as a result of musculoskeletal trauma and spinal cord injury sustained during the automobile accident; that heterotopic ossification was not and could not be caused by wrists restraints.

On the other hand, the expert presented by plaintiff opined that it is widely accepted that gentle and active passive range of motion substantially limits the risk of HO and that the failure to position and move plaintiff’s arms for several hours during the day was a substantial factor in the development of his HO, to the degree and nature that it could cause such severe upper extremity dysfunction.

The expert also stated that even with HO, plaintiff’s severe bilateral elbow contractures were avoidable had his arms not been improperly restrained. He asserts that contractures occur when tendons/muscles harden and become `fixed’ or less elastic as a result of disuse; that in plaintiff’s case, the contractures were a separate and distinct injury from HO; and that the failure to reposition plaintiff’s arms for several hours a day on the days he was restrained was a substantial factor in causing his contractures and loss of range of motion in both arms.
According to the Court, the requisite elements of proof in a medical malpractice action are (1) a deviation or departure from accepted standards of medical practice, and (2) evidence that such a departure was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. On a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action, a defendant doctor has the burden of establishing the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice, or that the plaintiff was not injured thereby. Defendant must make this showing through medical records and competent expert affidavits. Once the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rise a triable issue of fact.

In this case, the Court held that defendants have made a prima facie showing entitling them to summary judgment with respect to their claim that the wrist restraints used on plaintiff did not cause plaintiff to contract heterotopic ossification. In this regard, both of defendants’ experts testified, and the record reveals, that the use of the wrist restraints on plaintiff was necessary because he was frequently described as restless and was considered at risk for self-injury. In addition, noting that heterotopic ossification is a rare condition which is most frequently seen with musculoskeletal trauma, spinal cord injury or central nervous system injury; that plaintiff had sustained spinal cord injury as a result of his accident; and that the relationship between spinal cord injury and heterotopic ossification was well established, Dr. B opined that plaintiff developed heterotopic ossification as a result of musculosekletal trauma and spinal cord injury sustained during the automobile accident, and that it was not and could not be caused by wrist restraints.

Defendants, however, have failed to make a prima facie showing that the wrist restraints did not cause plaintiff’s elbow contractures. In this regard, Dr. B opined that plaintiff’s elbow contractures were not caused by stiffness/tightness associated with atrophy from lack of use, asserting that there was no evidence that the restraints caused circularory impairment, were improperly positioned, or that plaintiff developed pressure sores in the upper extremities.
Thus, defendants’ own papers raise an issue of fact as to whether the proper protocols with respect to wrist restraints were consistently followed, and if not, whether the failure to do so was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s contractures.

In any event, plaintiff has raised a question of fact as to whether his heterotopic ossification and contractures resulted from defendants’ negligent use of wrist restraints on him, which precludes the court from granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. With respect to plaintiff’s heterotopic ossification, plaintiff’s expert asserted that during some of the days plaintiff was restrained, he was not properly monitored according to hospital protocol. Plaintiff’s expert also opined that they were avoidable had plaintiff’s arms not been improperly restrained.

As such, defendants’ argument that plaintiff did not rebut their showing that there was sufficient documentation that plaintiff was continuously monitored, and that there is no evidence which suggests that heterotopic ossification has any relation to immobilization or restraint, is without merit.
Further, while defendants argue that plaintiff’s expert did not rebut their expert’s contention that heterotopic ossification is a rare condition and most frequently seen with, among other things, spinal cord injury, plaintiff’s expert raised an issue of fact as to whether the failure to properly monitor the wrist restraints caused plaintiff’s elbow contractures and heterotopic ossification. In addition, contrary to defendants’ claims, plaintiff’s expert specified how the restraint protocol was not followed.
That branch of defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s cause of action for lack of informed consent was granted by the Court. Defendants have made a prima facie showing, through their expert affirmations, that a reasonably prudent person would have undergone all of the procedures plaintiff underwent if informed of the risks and benefits of the procedures. Plaintiff has failed to address this cause of action in his opposition.
Finally, in light of the factual issues raised, the court declined to search the record and grant plaintiff partial summary judgment.

In sum, that branch of defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s cause of action for lack of informed consent is granted, and the remainder of defendants’ motion is denied.
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The issue before the court has to do with the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1986 that requires the Medical Malpractice Insurance Association to refund the stabilization reserve fund charges that had been collected for excess policies and applied by statute to offset deficits. The plaintiff in the case is challenging the constitutionality of the implementation and enforcement of certain provisions of this act.

Background Information
The Medical Malpractice Insurance Association or MMIA is a non-profit unincorporated association that is a legal entity separate from its members. The MMIA in NYC was created by chapter 109 section 17 of the laws created in 1975. The association was created after the insurer that covered the majority of surgeons and physicians for professional liability stated that they would no longer underwrite this type of insurance policy in the state of New York. The MMIA’s purpose was to provide a market for medical malpractice insurance that was not otherwise readily available.

The MMIA is required to provide medical malpractice insurance to any physician applicant. The primary policy limits provided to the physicians have limits of $1,000,000 per claim and $3,000,000 for all claims in any single year. In 1985 a mandate was created by the legislature that required the primary policy limits to provide excess coverage of at least $1,000,000 per claim and a $3,000,000 aggregate for any policy year to the physicians they insured. In addition, MMIA was required to provide excess coverage to all applicants irrespective of the placement of their medical malpractice coverage.

From the beginning the MMIA has been required to maintain a stabilization reserve fund for the purpose of offsetting its deficits. When this particular action began the MMIA in Manhattan had over $10,000,000 in stabilization reserve fund charges. There was also an unpaid balance for stabilization reserve fund charges that were earned on excess policies that were in effect between July first of 1985 through the 30th of June, 1986.

In July of 1986 the Medical Malpractice Reform Act amended a section of the Insurance Law. The amendment requires the MMIA to refund any excess stabilization reserve fund charges to the hospitals that have paid the premium and surcharge on behalf of their doctors between July first 1985 and June 30th, 1986.

Case Issues and Discussion
MMIA has moved for an order to enjoin the implementation of the provision of the legislations that requires the association to refund stabilization refund charges. The defendants cross moved to dismiss the complaint of MMIA for failure to state a cause of action. The cross motion by the defendant was denied by the motion court and the court enjoined the state from requiring that the MMIA

The main issue at hand is whether or not the new legislation can be implemented retroactively.
Case Decision
The court has reviewed the facts of the case and there is no argument about the fact that the MMIA currently has a deficit of over $80 million. Allowing this law to be retroactively implemented would be detrimental to the association. Therefor the court has ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
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Petitioner minor child, represented by his parents is permanently and substantially brain damaged as a result of alleged medical malpracticeon the part of respondent physician and respondent medical center, as well as other medical providers. The petitioner parents filed suit in circuit court against their obstetrician, respondent, his professional association, respondent Hospital, and numerous other defendants. A Florida Medical Malpractice Lawyer said that, the trial court abated the circuit court proceedings for a determination by the Division of Administrative Hearings as to whether the infant’s injuries qualified for coverage under the NICA Plan. In the petition for determination of NICA coverage, petitioners alleged that long after the post-delivery period had ended, the minor child’s medical providers committed numerous errors, including administering too much IV fluid and failing to test for serum electrolyte derangements until numerous days after the delivery. As required by statute, NICA was served with the petition in the administrative proceedings. NICA intervened and took the position that he did not suffer a “birth-related neurological injury” within the scope of section 766.302(2).

A Lawyer said that, in a narrow category of cases in which a “birth-related neurological injury” occurs, parents’ common law rights to sue on behalf of their children for medical malpractice are eliminated and replaced by an administrative remedy that provides limited compensation on a no-fault basis. “Birth-related neurological injury” is defined by statute as “injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired.” § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. (2001).

A Lawyer said that, the First District held that the petitioners were limited to the administrative remedy provided by the NICA Plan, reversing the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ), who found that the minor child did not suffer a “birth-related neurological injury” as defined by the NICA Plan.

The issue in this case is whether, under the factual circumstances of this case, the minor child suffered a “birth-related neurological injury,” which would require the petitioners to obtain limited compensation through the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (NICA Plan) instead of full damages in a court of law.

In deciding the case the Court said that, in 1988, the Florida Legislature created the NICA Plan as a means to alleviate the high costs of medical malpractice insurance for physicians practicing obstetrics. The Legislature found that obstetricians were among the most severely affected by the increasing medical malpractice insurance premiums and that the costs of birth-related neurological injury claims were particularly high.. Consequently, the Legislature created the NICA fund to “provide compensation, on a no-fault basis, for a limited class” of birth-related neurological injuries. Because the NICA Plan provides limited remedies as a statutory substitute for common law rights and liabilities, this Court has held that the NICA statute “should be strictly construed to include only those subjects clearly embraced within its terms.” The NICA Plan does not cover all incidents of brain damage sustained by an infant delivered by an obstetrician. No party in this case contends that the statute provides immunity from suit to physicians practicing obstetrics for alleged malpractice occurring during labor and delivery; rather, the immunity is narrowly circumscribed by the term “birth-related neurological injury.” Specifically, the Legislature has limited coverage under the NICA Plan to a “birth-related neurological injury,” which it defined as injury to the brain or spinal cord of a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams for a single gestation caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. This definition shall apply to live births only and shall not include disability or death caused by genetic or congenital abnormality.
Thus, based on the language of the statute, a birth-related neurological injury has four components: (1) an injury to the brain or spinal cord; (2) which is caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury; (3) during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period; and (4) which renders the infant permanently and substantially impaired.
The ALJ has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a claim is compensable under the NICA Plan. (“The issue of whether such claims are covered by this act must be determined exclusively in an administrative proceeding.”). In making this determination, the ALJ is required to make the following determinations: (1) whether the injury claimed is a birth-related neurological injury; (2) whether obstetrical services were delivered by a participating physician in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital; and (3) the amount of compensation that is awardable. In determining whether the injury is a birth-related neurological injury, section 766.309(1)(a) provides for a rebuttable presumption as follows:

If the claimant has demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the administrative law judge, that the infant has sustained a brain or spinal injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury and that the infant was thereby rendered permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the injury is a birth-related neurological injury as defined in s. 766.302(2)§ 766.309(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). Through this presumption, the claimant does not need to demonstrate that the injury occurred during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period. Under the NICA statute, NICA is the administrator of the NICA Plan and has statutory responsibilities, including the responsibility to administer the funds collected on behalf of the Plan, administer the payment of claims on behalf of the Plan, exercise all powers necessary to effect any of the purposes for which the Plan was created, and take legal action as necessary to avoid the payment of improper claims, among other duties.

Because the issue involves whether the First District properly interpreted the NICA statute, this Court’s standard of review is de novo. The Court must begin with the actual language in the statute “because legislative intent is determined primarily from the statute’s text.” As this Court has often repeated, “When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Further, courts are “without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.” Likewise, when a court interprets a statute, “it must give full effect to all statutory provisions. Courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” Another important principle that applies in this case is that because the NICA Plan limits the remedies as a statutory substitute for common law rights and liabilities, its provisions should be strictly construed. In applying the statute to this case, there is no factual dispute that the minor child suffered from two incidents of oxygen deprivation: one on September 26, 2001, and the other on October 3, 2001. Nor is there any question that she suffered a brain injury that rendered her permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. The only question becomes whether the minor child’s brain injury occurred “in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital.”

Here, the ALJ made factual findings that Tristan did not suffer a “birth-related neurological injury” as defined by the NICA Plan because the minor child’s profound neurologic impairments resulted from a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation that occurred on October 3, 2001, and not during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in the hospital.” In making this determination, the ALJ found that although the record established that the minor child, more likely than not, suffered from oxygen deprivation at birth on September 26, resulting in a multi-system failure that included her liver and kidneys, this oxygen deprivation did not cause a substantial neurological impairment. In support of this finding, the ALJ noted that the record established that she was delivered a traumatically, responded well to initial resuscitation, and her neurological examinations during the first seven days of life were normal. However, on October 3, she suffered prolonged and severe acidosis and shortly thereafter evidenced seizure activity and neurological decline. The Court holds that a narrow construction of the statute is the more reasonable interpretation. First, it restricts the impact of the statute to those situations involving obstetricians, who are the group of physicians that the NICA Plan was designed to benefit. Otherwise, as NICA points out in its brief, under the First District’s interpretation, the statute would be expanded to cover situations where an infant is “transferred from the delivery room” and the “obstetrician relinquishes responsibility of the infant to other health care providers.”

The Court concludes that the First District’s statutory construction analysis of the applicable statute was flawed in two separate ways. First, the district court interpreted the phrase “immediate post-delivery period in the hospital” to mean “an extended period of days when a baby is delivered with a life-threatening condition and requires close supervision.” Because the First District failed to read the phrase “immediate post-delivery period” as modifying “resuscitation,” the First District expanded the NICA Plan to cover infants beyond the limit contemplated by the express language of the statute. Second, the First District incorrectly held that under section 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), the rebuttable presumption of coverage under the NICA Plan applied to benefit the defendants, even though the petitioners were not making a claim for compensation under the NICA Plan.

Accordingly, the Court holds that in order for a “birth-related neurological injury” to occur, the birth injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation, which renders the infant permanently and substantially impaired, must occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period. That period does not encompass an additional “extended period of time when a baby is delivered in a life-threatening condition” unless there are ongoing and continuous efforts of resuscitation. Both the incident of oxygen deprivation and the brain injury resulting from the oxygen deprivation must occur in this time period. Further, regarding the statutory presumption, only the individual seeking compensation under the NICA Plan is entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption. Based on our analysis, the Court approves the analysis in Orlando Regional to the extent that it is consistent with this decision, quash the First District’s decision below, and remand to the First District with directions to affirm the ALJ’s final order. Long Island and Manhattan Courts have dealt with similar cases.

In view of the foregoing, the Court held that in reviewing the facts under the correct interpretation of the statute, the Court holds that the ALJ’s finding that the minor child did not sustain a “birth-related neurological injury” under the NICA Plan is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
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In this case the plaintiffs are seeking to recover damages for medical malpractice. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants cared for the plaintiff while she was pregnant and that one of the twins died in utero as a result this care.

Case Background
The plaintiffs of the case are seeking to recover damages for alleged malpractice by the defendants. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants cared for the plaintiff while she was pregnant and that one of her twins died in utero as a result of this care. The plaintiff states that she sustained personal injuries, emotional distress, and pecuniary loss.

The Manhattan plaintiffs allege that she came under the care of the midwife in January of 2004. The plaintiffs allege that the other two defendants were employees of the midwife. During her labor and delivery the wife was attended to by one of the employees of the midwife. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant was careless and negligent and departed from good and acceptable standards of medical practice by failing to properly monitor and follow up with the care and treatment of the plaintiff. The plaintiffs further allege that the defendants did not assist in the care and treatment of her and failed to take the necessary precautions in order to prevent damage and injury to the plaintiff and her twins.

The Westchester defendants seek summary judgment in the case to have the complaints against them dismissed. The defendant doctors argue that they cannot be held liable in this matter because the plaintiff had hired a midwife for the delivery of the twins. When a midwife is hired the doctors take a background role and are only there to offer advice and for this reason they cannot be held liable for the incident at hand.

Court Discussion and Decision
The court has carefully reviewed the facts of the case including the care that caused the demise of one of the infant twins. The plaintiff has provided expert affirmation in the case, but has failed to show the existence of material issues of fact in regard to the care and treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant doctors. The plaintiffs have also not established an existence of material issues in regard to the care provided at the defendant hospital.

For this reason, the court is granting the motions from the defendant doctors and the hospital. The complaints made against them are dismissed.

In regard to the case against the midwife, the court finds that there are triable issues of fact in regard to the case. The motion made by the midwife defendant for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint against her is denied. The ruling in this regard is in favor of the plaintiff.
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This is a claim for medical malpractice against the Manhattan health and hospitals corporation brought by a mother, individually and on behalf of her son. The infant was born at one hospital and allege that the infant sustained meconium aspiration syndrome and hypertonia as a result of the hospital’s mismanagement of the labor and delivery. Though the infant was transferred to another hospital and stayed for almost two weeks, he was then transferred back with the previous hospital where he received continuous treatment. It is also alleged that the infant suffers from brain injury and severe developmental delays.

At the beginning, the court had lack of authority to grant the leave to file a late notice of claim as to the mother’s individual claims because her application is made more than one year and ninety days from the accrual of the incident. As to the infant’s claims, based on the dates of the alleged malpractice, a notice of claim should have been served on the hospital corporations but the infant is the beneficiary of an infancy toll.

Further, entries in the medical records reveal that the infant was developing normally at the time of discharge and there is no indication of a long term injury. In the supporting affidavit, the mother admits to being aware of the conclusion by noting that at the age of three months her son had met all developmental milestones. A neurology visit note also supports the said conclusion. The mother also stated that about 17 months after her delivery, her son had once again met all milestones. The mother stated that she did not learn of her son’s alleged delays until some point and that it was not until more findings led her to believe that her son’s injury was in fact related to his birthing process. It is evident that the mother could not have been aware of any damages attributable to the delivery within 90 days of the date of accrual, or a reasonable time thereafter, as there was no indication that the infant experiences any alleged delays. Consequently, the subject medical records alone do not support that the mother, by its acts or omissions, inflicted injuries to the infant and that the mother should have been aware of same within the applicable 90 days, or a reasonable time thereafter.

Based on records, the ignorance of the law requiring that a notice of claim be filed is not an acceptable excuse. Furthermore, there is no support for the assertion that the delay was the product of infancy or of the need to provide the infant with extraordinary care.

Finally, the complainant’s Bronx expert explained in a conclusory manner that the hospital committed medical negligence and malpractice by failing to timely deliver the infant, resulting in damages. However, the complainant’s expert fails to offer the necessary nexus between the act of the opponents and any damage to the complainant that would put the hospital on notice that a claim would be filed with regard to the delivery at issue.

As the facts documented in the chart would not place the opponent on notice of a claim and the application is denied. Merely asserting that because the infant suffered a difficult neonatal course, the opponent was on notice of a malpractice claim is rejected. To prevail on the application, the complainant must establish that the hospital corporation had notice that the hospital departed from the standard of care in treating the infant, and that those departures caused the infant’s injuries. As a result, the complainants have not established those elements and their application are denied.
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An action to recover damages for medical malpractice was filed. The defendant was found by the court, on the issue of liability, to be 75% at fault and the plaintiff 25% at fault in the causation of the plaintiff’s injuries; and, on the issue of damages, that the plaintiff sustained damages in the sums of $150,000 for past mental distress, $50,000 for future mental distress, and $134,000 for loss of past financial support, and awarded the plaintiff the sum of $166,000 in punitive damages.

Defendant then appeals from the aforesaid decision and upon the denial of his motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict on the issue of liability as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial or, in the alternative, to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of liability and for judgment as a matter of law, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the principal sum of $416,500, and the plaintiff cross-appeals from stated portions of the same judgment.

The Ruling:
Under the rules, a jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached its verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence.
Here, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for medical malpractice and, thus, was required to prove that the defendant’s deviation from good and accepted medical practice proximately caused her injury. The credible evidence at trial established that the plaintiff sought and obtained treatment from the defendant for, among other things, mental health issues, and that, during and after the course of the treatment for mental health issues, the defendant and the plaintiff became involved with each other sexually for a period of approximately nine months. After the sexual relationship began, and concurrently with it, the Manhattan plaintiff was also treated by a Long Island therapist who was recommended by the defendant. The plaintiff disclosed to that therapist that she was having an affair, but she did not disclose that the affair was with the defendant since, as the plaintiff explained at trial, the therapist and the defendant were friends. The jury found that the defendant’s conduct departed from good and accepted medical practice, and that this departure proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress and economic loss. The jury found that the defendant was 75% at fault and the plaintiff was 25% at fault with respect to the plaintiff’s injuries. The jury also awarded the plaintiff punitive damages in the sum of $166,000.

The court finds that the plaintiff made a prima facie showing at trial that the defendant committed medical malpractice. Furthermore, the jury’s verdict on the issue of liability was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence and, thus, was not contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. As the plaintiff’s expert has testified, by reason of the particularly sensitive nature of the relationship between a mental health provider and a patient, including the emotional dependence of the patient on the provider, a sexual relationship between the patient and the provider is very likely to harm the patient. A sexual relationship between a mental health provider and a patient is a departure from the standard of care, whether it is characterized as part of the treatment or independent of it and it is a departure even when it takes place after the treatment has ended. In the instant case, the plaintiff relied on the defendant for treatment, medication, and talk therapy relating to mental health issues arising, at least in part, out of problems she was having in her marriage. Her sexual relationship with the defendant began while that mental health treatment was continuing, and it clearly had an impact upon the plaintiff’s level of trust and openness with her other therapist. The fact that the plaintiff acknowledged that the sexual relationship between the defendant and her was not part of the treatment does not mitigate the breach of trust and, therefore, does not mitigate the defendant’s breach of duty. More so, as stated in the expert testimony adduced by the plaintiff, it was entirely foreseeable that eroticized transference, in which the doctor becomes, for the patient, a very sexually charged figure, would occur as a result of the treatment. Rather than competently dealing with that transference, as the applicable standard of care requires, the defendant exploited it. In addition, a mental health provider’s duty is different, and a sexual relationship between that provider and a patient violates the trust that lies at the heart of the relationship. It is irrelevant that the defendant was not actually a psychiatrist. When the defendant started providing talk therapy, he assumed the duty of care applicable to mental health providers.

In sum, the defendant undoubtedly committed medical malpractice by having a sexual relationship with the plaintiff, even where the plaintiff knew that the sexual relationship was not in furtherance or a part of the medical treatment; the jury’s determination to award punitive damages was justified; the evidence established that the defendant’s departure from the standard of care predictably and inevitably damaged the plaintiff in those areas for which she sought treatment and was most vulnerable; over the prolonged period during which the defendant departed from the applicable standard of care, the defendant’s reprehensible conduct evinced a gross indifference to his patient’s well-being; the Court properly denied the defendant’s midtrial application to preclude evidence of certain special damages, inasmuch as, among other things, that application was untimely; and, the jury’s award did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation. The court finds the parties’ remaining contentions without merit. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
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The standard of healthcare in some of Yorkshires best hospitals and clinics has been called into question. This problem has become so serious that it is costing taxpayers over £150 per minute. Almost a third of this money will go directly to lawyers.

The NHS has had to pay out for various medical negligence cases. This costs the NHS over £80 million per year. This is money that could be better off spent providing better medical treatment.

Clinics in Yorkshire have experienced over 1,280 cases against them. These cases include medical malpractice and medical. The number of cases seemed to be increasing every year, with a 10% increase in the number of cases in 2010.

The Manhattan report explains that the government has been forced to introduce new laws which can be used to reduce the number of claims against doctors.

However, as the report points out, these reforms might make it much more difficult for any injured patients to get the compensation they deserve. It could also stop many cases coming to light.

Almost a quarter of the payments were a result of poor treatment provided to young babies and pregnant ladies.

The source explains that the government has outlined changes to the legal system. This should prevent the health service from needing to pay lawyers’ fees and insurance premiums when cases are lost.

It’s also been suggested to stop offering legal aid for these negligence claims as this is encouraging more people to file lawsuits.

Some patients are critical over these reforms. Although they will reduce the costs to the NHS it will do nothing to help the people who are injured at the hands of the health care system.

Many Long Island lawyers can see the reforms halving the number of medical malpractice cases in Yorkshire. An investigation to these reforms is currently ongoing to try and decide whether or not they are in the public interest.

Medical malpractice lawsuits are a major problem around the world. While they do help many people, many other people are wondering whether they are negatively affecting health care in the country.
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Health is the most precious thing that we all own, that’s why there are increasing numbers of doctors all over the world. In Islamabad there are over 600,000 active unqualified doctors practicing medicine explains a well-known doctor. An estimated 70,000 of these doctors are thought to be at risk of spreading diseases and infections due to poor hygiene and practices. These doctors lack the basic medical training which would ensure that patients are kept safe from infectious diseases.

Medical malpractice is a common problem which can happen anywhere. The doctor remarks that malpractice claims are increasing every year in America with many more patients filing suits. Although most of the doctors in America are qualified, there is still a risk that they will neglect their patients.

Many patients in the US suffer permanent injuries and scarring for the rest of their lives, and others die as a result of incorrect medical treatment. While there are risks associated with every medical procedure, it’s important that negligence itself does not increase the risks.

The Pakistan Medical Association is trying to crack down on these unqualified doctors to make the healthcare system in the country much safer. This is the reason why the American Government regulates the healthcare industry so tightly. Doctors practicing medicine must be licensed and any claims against them will be investigated carefully.

Many of these unqualified doctors get work because of testimonials from previous patients. While some patients will be treated successfully without endangering their lives, many more are put at unnecessary risk. This is a form of medical malpractice, but few people in the country bother filing for malpractice suits like happens in the USA.

Americans in Manhattan and Brooklyn are advising experts in Pakistan about how to revise the healthcare system in the country to make it safer. The country is spending millions of dollars on supervising the medical sector and trying to improve the safety records. The American Medical Malpractice Lawyer mentions that healthcare is a very important concern for governments all around the world.
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The University of Miami has been trying to protect its doctors from malpractice suits for years. They finally managed to do this explained a well-known Medical MalpracticeLawyer. Florida lawmakers have agreed to extend the lawsuit protection to university doctors when they are working in a public hospital.

It’s suspected that the bill will become law. The state protects all hospital employees who are employed by the government from any major malpractice judgment. However, University of Miami school doctors who teach are not protected in the same way.

University of Miami officials have been trying to get the same benefits for their employees for over two decades. The university argues that many patients will sue the university instead of the hospital because the university is less familiar with these cases and more likely to pay out.

The university needs to pay over $40 million per year on defending malpractice. It’s thought that the new legislation could cut the expense from defending these cases in Manhattan and Long Island by half. This will be a major cost saving for the university.

The university believes that this is a useful bill which will even out the playing field and make it much easier for the university to compete and offer good medical facilities to its patients.

Jackson hospital backed the proposals and Florida International University also supported it. This is because the university also wants the students to study along with UM doctors at Jackson Hospital.

The measure was opposed by many trial lawyers who did not want the bill to be passed. The lawyers tried to say that this bill accepted negative negligence and accepted that it would happen. It also said that the medical universities didn’t have enough requirements to keep records. Lawyers argued that the university hospitals will need to keep the same records as state hospitals.

The senate voted to make sure that the expert witnesses which can be called are chosen and regulated by the state. This puts restrictions on using out of state experts as was common with almost all medical malpractice cases claims the Lawyer.
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New legislation has been passed in the state of Florida to restrict the ability of patients to sue medical professionals who try to provide treatment to them explains a report.

Many republican lawmakers are trying to justify the cost of the state’s Medicaid program. They are trying to reduce costs to the hospitals by reducing the chances of lawsuit losses for hospitals in the state. This is designed as a way of encouraging cooperation between doctors, hospitals and insurance companies.

The House of Representatives recently passed new legislation that would restrict using expert witnesses in lawsuit cases explains a source. The bill first said that hospitals would not be held liable for negligence of contracted providers unless the hospital exercises complete control.

Doctors and lawyers in Manhattan and Long island have been trying to find a way to reform and improve the healthcare system in the state. This new legislation is said to be a step in the right direction to make it a much friendlier place to practice medicine.

Many Lawyers have claimed that Florida needs to scale back on malpracticelawsuits so that more doctors will remain working in the state rather than traveling somewhere else. The caps put on malpractice cases in 2003 has helped to improve the situation, and this new bill should make things even better.

Many doctors and hospitals are against Medicare because it reduces their profits. By offering to limit the malpractice cases they can encounter, it is designed to make them work together as more of a team.

When the final Medicaid reform bill is unveiled to the public it is expected that there will also be new caps placed on medical malpractice cases. The senate’s Medicaid plan will limit the wrongful death cases to $250,000.

Doctors and hospitals treating patients through the Medicaid system would have the liability capped at $300,000. The only reason this cap could be passed would be if the provider has acted maliciously or in bad faith.

After the reforms of 2003 the number of medical malpractice claims has decreased significantly. This has helped to attract more doctors to work in the state.
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