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On April 6, 2007, the New York State Emergency Medical Services (EMS) responded to a call just before ten at night to an apartment on Colonial Road in Brooklyn. The call was related to a twenty-five year old woman bleeding vaginally. Upon their arrival, the EMS team noticed that there was blood in the shower area and that the young woman who was seated on the commode was bleeding from her vagina. She was cold and clammy and was transported immediately. The EMS team asked her if she was pregnant or if she could be pregnant. She stated that she was not. However, upon admittance into the hospital at Lutheran Medical Center, the doctors discovered that it was clear that she had recently given birth to a child. The woman refused to admit that she had delivered a baby.

The Long Island hospital personnel contacted the police department to locate the baby. The police officers returned to the apartment and questioned the sister of the woman who was in the hospital. They told her that the hospital had said that there was a baby and that they needed to check on the welfare of the child. They repeatedly asked the sister where the baby was. She denied that there was a baby, but finally told them that there were several garbage bags outside in the cold night air behind the apartment. When the officers examined the contents of the garbage bags, they discovered the body of a newborn infant girl in the trash. She was still alive, but showing no signs of life other than being pink in color. She was intubated and transferred to the hospital for emergency medical care. The infant died shortly after arrival. Her cause of death was from exposure to the cold and hypoxia brought on by being tied up in a garbage bag.

The young woman was charged with homicide in causing the death of her newborn infant. The defense attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was collected by the police officers because they contend that it should be excluded from the case under the exclusionary rule. Their contention was based on the idea that the police officers had responded to the location without a warrant and had located the infant based on confidential medical information that was illegally obtained.

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On or about 2 January 1975, defendant who is a physician commenced an action against the plaintiffs in the District Court, Nassau County, to recover the sum of $750 for professional services rendered on or about 21 May 1974, with interest. A default judgment was entered in that action against the plaintiffs on 7 February 1975.

On 22 March 1976, plaintiffs commenced the instant personal injury action against a doctor and a Hospital for medical malpractice (for the injury sustained as a result of the negligence in the care of plaintiff) allegedly committed during the period between 27 May 1974 and 22 June 1974, in which issue was joined by the individual defendant on 27 October 1976. Thereafter, the defendant doctor moved, inter alia, to amend his answer to assert the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel and, in the alternative, a summary judgment. The plaintiffs then cross-moved for leave to serve a supplemental Bill of Particulars. The motion to amend defendant’s answer and the motion for summary judgment was denied. Thus, defendant doctor appeals the said judgment.

The Issues:

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On 19 October 1970, a doctor performed a surgical excision of a node from plaintiff’s neck. Allegedly, during the operation on plaintiff’s neck, the surgeon negligently injured a spinal-accessory nerve in her neck and also injured branches of her cervical plexus. Following the operation, plaintiff told her surgeon that she was experiencing numbness in the right side of her face and neck and that it was difficult and painful for her to raise her right arm. The physician was allegedly aware of the negligent manner in which he had performed the surgery and, as a result, plaintiff suffered a potentially permanent personal injury; that the physician willfully, falsely and fraudulently told plaintiff that her post-operative problems, pain and difficulties were transient and that they would disappear if she would continue a regimen of physiotherapy which he had prescribed and which was then being given by another doctor. Consequently, plaintiff continued with the physiotherapy prescribed by the subject doctor until October 1974. Meanwhile, she had moved to Syracuse, New York, where she sought further medical advice. In January 1974, she was first apprised by the Syracuse physician of the true nature of her injury and that it probably had been caused at the time of her surgery. This doctor’s diagnosis was substantially confirmed in October 1974 by a professor of medicine, specializing in neurology, at Upstate Medical Center in Syracuse, who also advised that reanastomosis of the sectioned nerve four years after the surgery would not be a physiologically successful procedure. Allegedly, the doctor who performed the surgery on plaintiff had intentionally withheld information as to the true nature and source of her injury, thus, she was deprived of the opportunity for a cure of her condition.

Sometime in April 1976, the present personal injury action against the surgical doctor was commenced. Prior to service of an answer, the doctor moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 on the ground that the cause or causes of action alleged were barred by the Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff then cross-moved for leave to amend her complaint to include a cause of action for malpractice.

The Supreme Court in Westchester denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint, as requested. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff thereupon appealed the said decision.

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On 10 October 1956, an infant who was about fifteen months old, while at home, suffered severe burns for which the defendants bear no responsibility. The infant was taken first to his family’s doctor who advised that he be taken to a hospital. The infant was then hospitalized at Kings County Hospital in Brooklyn.

On 11 October 1956, at 8:15 a. m., about thirteen hours after the infant was admitted to the hospital, he appeared to be unconscious and slightly cyanotic. Cyanosis is a condition in which the skin becomes blue, as a result of insufficient oxygen in the blood, or due to a malformation of the heart. The mother of the infant plaintiff, with respect to her son’s condition before he was admitted to Kings County Hospital, states that the boy was about a year old when he began to talk, that he started to walk at eleven months, fed himself and ate very good; however, when she took him home from the hospital, the infant could not walk, could not talk, did not respond when spoken to, and that his body still had jerky movements. The infant couldn’t hold up his head erect. It keeps bobbing, and he was not the same boy.

Consequently, a personal injury action for medical malpractice has been instituted. The defendants are the City of New York and Kings County Hospital. However, only the action against The City of New York went to the jury. The action against Kings County Hospital was dismissed during the trial.

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The Facts:

Petitioner was diagnosed with stomach cancer by hospital-one after undergoing an endoscopy and after staff at hospital-two and hospital-three who saw petitioner on many occasions through 2009 failed to make that diagnosis or perform any diagnostic testing. Petitioner claims that the delay in diagnosing her cancer allowed the cancer to progress and adversely affect her prognosis. Thus, an action for medical malpractice ensued.

Petitioner moves for leave to serve a late Notice of Claim, pursuant to the General Municipal Law. The New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (NYCHHC) opposes the petition, contending that there has been at least a six month delay in filing the Notice of Claim against NYCHHC, and, more than one year ninety day delay in filing the Notice of Claim against the individual respondent, who NYCHHC claims, and petitioner does not dispute, last saw petitioner on 9 May 2008.

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The Facts:

On 8 April 2005, the subject infant was born at a hospital. Allegedly, the infant sustained meconium aspiration syndrome and hypertonia as a result of the hospital’s mismanagement of the labor and delivery. Though the infant was transferred to another hospital on 9 April 2005 for almost two weeks, he was transferred back where he remained until 24 May 2005. Thereafter, he was treated at the same Hospital through 2006.

A claim for medical malpracticeagainst the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation thereafter ensued brought by the infant’s mother, individually and on behalf of her son, the subject infant. It is alleged that the infant suffers from brain injury and severe developmental delays.

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In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the wife of the plaintiff Ulysses Simmons gave birth to their daughter, the infant plaintiff, Ivette Sheyanne Simmons, following what was an otherwise normal and uncomplicated pregnancy, via vaginal delivery after about two hours of labor, at the defendant Brooklyn Hospital Center (hereinafter refered to as the Hospital). However, according to medical records, the infant plaintiff was born macrosomic (excessive size), blue and diagnosed with fetal hydrops, also referred to as hydrops fetalis (total body edema) presumably due to intrauterine infection, resulting in anemia, thrombocytopenia (low platelet count), and brain hemorrhage. The infant was subsequently diagnosed with cerebral palsy involving global developmental delays and seizures.

The plaintiffs commenced this medical malpractice action against, among others, the defendant Snehaprabha Lotlikar (hereinafter Dr. Lotlikar), an employee of the defendant Bedford-Williamsburg Medical Group, which is also sued herein as the defendant Central Brooklyn Medical Group, P.C. (hereafter together Bedford-Williamsburg). Dr. Lotlikar saw the mother during the 34th week of pregnancy, and then again during the 35th to 36th week of pregnancy.

A Lawyer said that, plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Lotlikar deviated from accepted medical practice by failing to perform a sonogram on each of those visits, and that said departure was a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s birth injuries because it would have revealed her macrosomic condition and fetal hydrops, which in turn would have led to delivery via cesarean section. Additionally, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendant Phillipe J. Day (hereinafter Dr. Day), who was also employed by Bedford-Williamsburg, and who was involved in the first hour of the mother’s labor at the Hospital, alleging that he deviated from accepted medical practice by failing to perform a sonogram. The plaintiffs also sought relief against Dr. Waltrous, who was also employed by Bedford-Williamsburg, and who was involved in the second hour of the mother’s labor and actually delivered the infant plaintiff, alleging that she deviated from accepted medical practice by failing to perform a sonogram. The plaintiffs also sought relief against Patrick LeBlanc (hereafter Dr. LeBlanc), who was employed by the Hospital, and who treated the infant plaintiff immediately following her delivery in the Hospital’s neo-natal intensive care unit for her hydrops fetalis condition, alleging that he deviated from accepted medical practice by engaging in a more conservative course of treatment, rather than performing aggressive treatment referred to as paracentisis and thoracentesis (the insertion of tubes into the body to remove fluids therefrom). Additionally, the plaintiffs seek to hold the Hospital vicariously liable for Dr. LeBlanc’s alleged medical malpractice, and to hold Bedford-Williamsburg vicariously liable for the alleged medical malpractice of Drs. Lotlikar, Day, and Waltrous. The defendants’ moved and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as the complaint asserted against them.

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In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, a source said that, plaintiff Valerie Abdelkader, mother and natural guardian of Laila Abdelkader, alleged that Laila’s Erb’s Palsy injury was caused by the medical malpractice of the defendant doctor in connection with the obstetrical care administered at Laila’s birth on July 2, 1997. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the principal sums of $300,000 for past pain and suffering and $500,000 for future pain and suffering.

Thereafter, a source said that, the defendant appeals the judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated October 17, 2007, which, upon a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against him finding that the plaintiff sustained damages in the principal sums of $300,000 for past pain and suffering and $500,000 for future pain and suffering, and upon an order of the same court dated May 31, 2007, which denied his motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence or to set aside the damages award as excessive, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the principal sums of $300,000 for past pain and suffering and $500,000 for future pain and suffering.

The issue in this case is whether the damages in accordance with the evidence presented, awarded to the plaintiff is excessive.

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On April 6, 2007, the New York State Emergency Medical Services (EMS) responded to a call just before ten at night to an apartment on Colonial Road in Brooklyn. The call was related to a twenty-five year old woman bleeding vaginally. Upon their arrival, the EMS team noticed that there was blood in the shower area and that the young woman who was seated on the commode was bleeding from her vagina. She was cold and clammy and was transported immediately. The EMS team asked her if she was pregnant or if she could be pregnant. She stated that she was not. However, upon admittance into the hospital at Lutheran Medical Center, the doctors discovered that it was clear that she had recently given birth to a child. The woman refused to admit that she had delivered a baby.

The hospital personnel contacted the police department to locate the baby. The police officers returned to the apartment and questioned the sister of the woman who was in the hospital. They told her that the hospital had said that there was a baby and that they needed to check on the welfare of the child. They repeatedly asked the sister where the baby was. She denied that there was a baby, but finally told them that there were several garbage bags outside in the cold night air behind the apartment. When the officers examined the contents of the garbage bags, they discovered the body of a newborn infant girl in the trash. She was still alive, but showing no signs of life other than being pink in color. She was intubated and transferred to the hospital for emergency medical care. The infant died shortly after arrival. Her cause of death was from exposure to the cold and hypoxia brought on by being tied up in a garbage bag.

The young woman was charged with homicide in causing the death of her newborn infant. The defense attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was collected by the police officers because they contend that it should be excluded from the case under the exclusionary rule. Their contention was based on the idea that the police officers had responded to the location without a warrant and had located the infant based on confidential medical information that was illegally obtained.

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A 30-year-old mother won a medical malpractice suit against a hospital. She was awarded $5 million. Her newborn’s birth injuries were the direct result of medical malpractice.

A source reports that medical records submitted to the court for the case show that the plaintiff’s medical history showed nothing to be concerned about in relation to her pregnancy. She had been progressing through her pregnancy normally as was expected. However, her midwife reports that she had to be taken to the hospital in the early stages of labor, dilated to 2cm.

An external fetal monitor was placed on her. About seven hours later, though, the monitor started detecting a decline in the baby’s heart rate, and was failing to show the complete tracing of the mother’s contractions.

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